Federal investigators have released new details about the runway excursion involving a 21 Air–operated Boeing 767 cargo aircraft at Miami International Airport, shedding light on a landing sequence that rapidly deteriorated into one of the most serious runway overruns in recent years. The accident occurred on September 6, when the aircraft, operating as Prime Air Flight 7598, arrived from San Juan and overran Runway 30, breaking through the airport perimeter and striking vehicles on the airport property and NW 67th Avenue. Five people on the ground were killed, and several others were injured. Both pilots survived.

According to the National Transportation Safety Board, the aircraft’s flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were recovered and successfully downloaded at the agency’s Washington laboratory. Early analysis shows the 767 touched down far beyond the normal landing zone and at a speed that left little remaining runway for deceleration. The NTSB reports that the nose gear and right main landing gear contacted the runway first, while the left main gear did not touch down until several seconds later—an unusually unstable landing profile for a wide-body-aircraft.

Investigators also noted that key deceleration systems did not activate during the landing roll. The flight data recorder shows no deployment of speed brakes or thrust reversers, and braking inputs were inconsistent as the aircraft approached the runway end. Roughly 15 seconds before the end of the cockpit voice recording, the throttles were advanced to go-around power, suggesting the crew may have attempted to abort the landing. By that point, however, the aircraft was too far down the runway and traveling too fast to either lift off or stop safely.

The NTSB has formed specialized groups to analyze aircraft performance, human factors, and ground impact dynamics. Weather conditions at the time included scattered rain showers, and investigators are reviewing whether visibility or runway conditions contributed to the unstable approach. A full cockpit voice recorder transcript is being prepared, and the agency cautions that determining probable cause will require additional analysis of pilot actions, aircraft systems, and operational procedures.

The investigation remains active, with further updates expected as the NTSB completes its performance modeling and systems examinations.

A Vietnam Airlines Boeing 787‑9 departing Munich on 15 August 2026 experienced a serious takeoff accident involving a runway overrun, delayed rotation, and tail strike before becoming airborne. The aircraft, operating Flight VN34 to Hanoi, accelerated down Runway 26L and reached V1, but then acceleration slowed as it neared the end of the runway. Instead, it continued past the runway threshold, traveled approximately 400 feet into and past the paved overrun area before aggressively rotating and climbing away. Runway 26L is 13,000 feet long.
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After takeoff cockpit indications alerted the crew to a tail strike and abnormal tire pressures. It has also been reported that brake temperatures were peaked at the maximum. The pilots leveled off, entered a holding pattern, and dumped fuel for nearly two hours before returning to Munich. Two low passes allowed ground crews to visually inspect the landing gear, and the aircraft landed safely on Runway 26R although multiple tires were destroyed. No injuries were reported among the 271 passengers and 16 crew, but the aircraft sustained significant structural damage to its aft fuselage, landing gear, and tail strike protection structure.
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Investigators are examining whether incorrect takeoff performance data—such as weight‑and‑balance entries, thrust settings, or assumed temperature calculations—may have been used. Additionally, skid marks from the tires were clearly visible near the end of the runway in media reporting of this incident, suggesting a possible brake malfunction of some kind. Dragging brakes would explain the slow acceleration although there is no other information to verify this.  
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Investigators from Germany’s BFU and Vietnam’s Civil Aviation Authority are investigating. The BFU has collected runway debris and documented damage to approach lighting structures struck during the overrun. Vietnam’s Ministry of Transport has ordered a broader review of airline training, dispatch procedures, and operational oversight. A preliminary report should be available very soon.
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The final report is expected to provide detailed insight into the chain of events that resulted in this runway overrun—a rare but high‑risk failure mode in commercial aviation.

A new final rule, FAA-2026-2295-0001, focuses on 787 shim gaps that may have exceeded engineering standards. The FAA states, “high pull up forces on the components may cause fatigue cracks to form at the fastener holes.” The AD requires repetitive ultrasonic inspections and other detailed inspections of various splice plates, spar terminal fittings, lower chords, and jack pads for any fatigue cracking.

The Foundation for Aviation Safety submitted a comment to the FAA when this AD was in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) stage. Below is the entire comment:

‍"This sounds a lot like what Boeing whistleblower Sam Salehpour reported during his April 17, 2024, testimony before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI). At the time, Boeing vehemently denied there were any structural problems with 787 airplanes.

According to the CNBC article from April 15, 2024, "In a roughly two-hour presentation with reporters on Monday, two Boeing engineering managers detailed the company’s stress and safety tests for the 787, which include testing the plane for 165,000 cycles, each meant to provide an equivalent of a flight, with varying conditions. In addition, the fuselage skin was struck by a 300-pound pendulum, the engineers said.

Steve Chisholm, chief engineer for Boeing’s mechanical and structural engineering, said Boeing created damage to fuselage panels in intense tests that were repeated more times than what aircraft would experience in service, 'and the damage didn’t grow.'"

This is the same problem, just in a different location on the plane. Had Boeing acted on prior warnings from their employees, this unsafe condition could have been mitigated years ago. Now we are back to delaying repairs.

What is the FAA doing to hold Boeing accountable for these ongoing manufacturing quality defects?"

‍The final rule includes an FAA response to our comment that illustrates how feckless the agency is when it comes to holding Boeing accountable for their serious manufacturing errors. Here is their response:

‍The Foundation for Aviation Safety asked what the FAA is doing to hold Boeing accountable for ongoing manufacturing quality defects. The question did not request a change to this AD, and the FAA has not changed the AD as a result.

‍In omitting most of the comment in their reply, the FAA disregarded the obvious: they should have investigated the whistleblowers claims years ago which may have eliminated the source of this structural problem. Since the question did not strictly address the AD, it was not addressed at all.

Boeing has sold off Wisk, Insitu, and SkyGrid to shed non‑core ventures and refocus capital and leadership attention on its core commercial and defense aircraft programs during a period of intense financial pressure, most of which is of their own making of course. If this improves their commercial aircraft manufacturing process it is a good move.
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Archer, the air-taxi company, has agreed to acquire all three Boeing subsidiaries, giving Boeing an ownership stake instead of purchasing with cash. Boeing will be paid mostly with new Archer shares and is expected to own about 16.5% of Archer. Boeing also agreed to invest up to $55 million in Archer’s next funding round. The deal lets Boeing reduce its advanced air-mobility holdings while retaining strategic exposure and access to Wisk’s autonomous flight technology. Wisk is best known for developing autonomous, electric air‑taxi aircraft aimed at creating a fully self‑flying urban air‑mobility service.
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Insitu operates in 35 countries and has built over 3,500 ISR drones. This gives Archer a revenue-generating defense business while its Midnight air taxi awaits commercial passenger certification.

Boeing’s engineers, scientists, analysts, designers, technicians and other specialists voted down contract offers from the company and authorized a strike, according to the workers’ union, the Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace-IFPTE Local 2001. The current contracts expire on October 6.
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The vote to reject the contract was overwhelming despite the 29.4% pay raise over the next four years. There were some inflation adjustment caps that were unpopular; however, the overriding concerns seem to be around company culture and mistrust.
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According to My Everett News, Boeing Vice President Bobbie Egan wrote:
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“With the disappointing vote results, we are now diverting those dollars to execute our plan and prepare for a potential strike. That means the retroactive pay and higher incentive plan target for 2026 are no longer available."
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This statement clearly delineates the Boeing priorities. Rather than negotiate further the company has reverted to strike preparations. This is an indication of the company culture and how it treats the nearly 17,000 employees within SPEEA. SPEEA’s Negotiation Team met with Boeing leadership on September 8 and delivered a set of specific demands and concerns. The union emphasized that trust and compensation are the core issues driving dissatisfaction among members.
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As reported by The Stand, union negotiators explained “It’s important to acknowledge how we got here; this mistrust was built brick-by-brick over the past several contracts. SPEEA-represented jobs eroded, quality and safety took a backseat to schedule, engineering and technical decisions were overruled or worse, ignored, and salaries failed to keep pace with both the market and inflation.” In addition to rejecting the contract, the membership authorized a strike that could begin as soon as October 7.