Aviation Watchdog Report
November 2025 EDITION

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is something you hear about often in the aviation world. Its role in transportation safety is essential, which is why it’s important to understand what the agency is – and what it explicitly is not. Let’s start from the beginning.

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Editor, Randy Klatt

The National Transportation Safety Board

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is something you hear about often in the aviation world. Its role in transportation safety is essential, which is why it’s important to understand what the agency is – and what it explicitly is not. Let’s start from the beginning.

The National Transportation Safety Board’s story begins in 1926, when Congress assigned the U.S. Department of Commerce the responsibility of investigating aircraft accidents. That authority shifted over the years until 1967, when Congress concluded that accident investigations should be the sole responsibility of a singular agency. Thus, the NTSB was established within the larger Department of Transportation (DOT).

But Congress soon saw a deeper issue: you can’t have the same department both promoting and policing transportation. In 1974, they took this commitment and reestablished the NTSB as an entirely solo entity outside the DOT. They reasoned that no agency can properly carry out such investigatory functions, "unless it is totally separate and independent."

And so, the NTSB as we know it became totally independent on April 1st, 1975. Since then, they have investigated more than 153,000 aviation accidents along with thousands of other transportation incidents in highway, marine, pipeline, and railroad transportation as well as those involving the transportation of hazardous material. For the last 30 years the NTSB has also been involved in commercial space investigations. They have issued over 15,500 safety recommendations – all guided by one mission: learn what went wrong and stop it from happening again.

Equally as important is understanding what the NTSB does not do. It does not determine fault, blame, or criminal liability; its focus is exclusively on safety. It is also distinct from the FAA, a common point of confusion. While the FAA is tasked with regulation and enforcement, the NTSB investigates and recommends. The NTSB has no regulatory authority; it can only make recommendations based on safety principles.

Behind the scenes, the NTSB operates through a carefully structured organization. It is guided by five Board Members, each nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate to serve five-year terms. One of these members serves as Chairman and another as Vice Chairman – each for three years. Supporting the Board is a staff of roughly 440 people, divided among specialized offices which carry out the day-to-day investigative work.

The Chairman is the Board’s chief executive officer and the chief administrative officer who manages investigations, employees, and an annual budget of approximately $150 million. Since 2021 the position has been held by Jennifer Homendy. This is a tiny entity compared to almost any other federal government agency.

Agency FY2025 Budget (approx.) Primary Mission
Department of Defense (DoD) $849 billion National defense and military operations
Department of Transportation (DOT) $108 billion Infrastructure, safety, and mobility
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) $24.8 billion Aviation safety, air traffic control, certification
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) $1.3 billion Road safety and vehicle standards
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) $155 million Independent accident investigation and safety advocacy

Prior to Homendy, Robert Sumwalt held the position from August 2017 to June 2021. Sumwalt now serves as the Executive Director of the Boeing Center for Aviation and Aerospace Safety at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. This center, while independent from Boeing, was renamed following a Boeing donation of $5.1 million. Sumwalt did not leave the NTSB for a position at Boeing. But his next employer certainly benefited from a large Boeing donation.

Although on paper the NTSB structure makes perfect sense, it is very dependent on industry representatives for technical support. This is primarily due to the minimal staff within the NTSB. With less than 500 people in total the organization simply doesn’t have the in-house staff necessary to carry out complex investigations in multiple transportation modes. This dependence requires organizations such as Boeing, Airbus, GE, and many other industry players to be named as parties to investigations conducted within the U.S. In the case of international investigations, the NTSB would be named an accredited representative if the aircraft involved is U.S. made or registered, a U.S. airline is involved, or U.S. citizens are fatally injured. NTSB investigators would then be involved in assistance roles and could then name industry partners as technical advisors. Some would say this relationship is vital to the success of each investigation. Others would say this essentially invites the investigated entities to be part of the investigation and amounts to a clear conflict of interest.

The relationship between the NTSB and FAA is also problematic. The overlap is impossible to ignore. The NTSB routinely investigates FAA actions, even issuing safety recommendations to them. At the same time, the FAA is routinely named a party to aviation investigations. This presents a difficult challenge as the NTSB must remain independent in all circumstances and follow the evidence wherever it takes them. How practical is that when they might be investigating those who are part of the investigation? Even the appearance of a conflict of interest can cause serious harm to any investigation and the entity conducting it.

The Foundation for Aviation Safety has called for a complete overhaul of the international aircraft accident investigation process. We covered this in October’s Aviation Watchdog Report. The current system was developed decades ago and is vulnerable to influence from the industry it investigates along with political and media pressures. Any new process must emphasize transparency, collaboration, and independent analysis, enabling global experts to contribute in near real-time. It is understood that the NTSB has valid reasons for keeping analysis and initial conclusions from the public while investigations are underway. In fact, in June 2024, the NTSB sanctioned Boeing for “blatantly violating” its agreement by disclosing non-public details and speculating about the cause of the 737 MAX 9 door plug blowout. But this policy should not prohibit the release of facts that are known to investigators early in the investigation. Clear evidence such as CVR and FDR information along with precise timelines could be released. Conversely, selectively worded descriptions and paraphrasing of actions taken along with the “bread crumbing” of information such as what occurred in the Air India 171 initial investigation report only serve to confuse people, implicate, and encourage speculation.

These incestuous relationships between the NTSB and industry representatives presents opportunity for influence in investigations. In 2022 Boeing submitted comments to the Ethiopian draft ET302 Aircraft Accident Investigation Report. Even though Boeing intentionally concealed the existence of MCAS (and later pleaded guilty to defrauding the FAA) they continued to blame the pilots for the accident. As technical advisors to this investigation they were prohibited from being involved in findings or conclusions. However, they did attempt to cast blame on the pilots by making these comments to the NTSB. In part, their comments included:

We propose that the probable cause in the final report present the following causal factors to fully reflect the circumstances of this accident:

  • uncommanded airplane-nose-down inputs from the MCAS due to erroneous AOA values and
  • the flight crew’s inadequate use of manual electric trim and management of thrust to maintain airplane control.  

The Foundation for Aviation Safety has also made very clear that the NTSB currently refuses to share Boeing and FAA documents with the Ethiopian Investigator-In-Charge (IIC) of the ET302 crash despite the request to do so from the Ethiopians. This violates ICAO Annex 13 rules and makes a mockery of what should be international cooperation to find the truth behind the crashes. It is not up to the NTSB to make a determination as to the relevance of these documents to the investigation. That falls to the IIC, yet he cannot make that determination without the NTSB formally providing the documents.

To be fair, industry experience and expertise are vital to accurate and complete investigations. But inclusion of these entities directly in the investigation opens a very big can of worms. Yes, there are specific roles and restrictions placed on the parties, accredited representatives, and technical advisors. But what really goes on behind the scenes? A new system that includes independent experts, more transparency, and can better guarantee the integrity of all investigations is vital. After all, the NTSB was born from the belief that safety oversight works best when it is entirely separate. With the interconnectedness we see today, remembering and protecting that principle matters more than ever.

Engine Shortages

Pratt & Whitney Engine Shortages Impact Fleets Across the World

Aircraft engine manufacturers, particularly Pratt & Whitney, are struggling to supply enough next generation high-bypass turbofan engines during a period of unprecedented demand. Fuel economy is a top priority for airlines around the world. This is not new for airlines, but more emphasis has been placed on it in recent years due to sector competition and environmental advocacies. A jet fuel price increase of just 5¢ per gallon can cost a major airline millions of dollars per week. Additionally, the industry is focused on improving the environmental impact caused by air travel. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) Director General has stated, “The entire aviation sector is united in its commitment to achieving net zero carbon emissions by 2050.” These factors led to the design and manufacture of the fuel-efficient engines; however, problems in manufacturing quality control and ongoing maintenance issues with installed engines have created a huge problem for the airlines.

This major disruption comes from production problems with the Pratt & Whitney PW1100G and PW1500G GTF engines. Material defects in the powdered metal used for the GTF fan disks and compressors have resulted in corrosion, premature wear, more frequent maintenance, and over 1,200 early engine replacements. The Airbus A320 and A220 are the most affected aircraft, and this has wreaked havoc among carriers flying those models.

These defects came to light in December 2022 when an IndiGo Airlines A320neo, equipped with a Pratt & Whitney PW1127GA-JM engine (part of the GTF family), aborted takeoff after it suffered a rotor separation in the HPC’s 7th stage. Fortunately, the aircraft returned to the gate with no injuries reported. As a result, the European Union Aviation Safety Authority (EASA) issued an initial Air Worthiness Directive (AD) followed quickly by the FAA. These ADs required repetitive inspections and any applicable repairs or replacement of engine components. Additional ADs have expanded the inspections to include PW1519G, PW1521G, PW1524G, PW1525G, PW1919G, PW1921G, PW1922G, and PW1923G engines used on A220 and A320neo aircraft.

Airlines have been forced to ground airplanes as they wait for replacement engines. This has led to a once inconceivable situation as these fuel-efficient engines are in some cases more valuable than the airframe they are intended for. Reportedly, GTF engines can be rented for up to $200,000 a month. That’s on par with a lease for a complete airplane.

Cannibalizing existing aircraft for engines is becoming more common. As covered in this recent Reuters story, many newer (a few years old) A321s have been parked and dismantled for their engines. Clearly there is a serious problem in the supply chain.

World-wide grounding totals are mind-boggling as are the associated revenue losses. Nearly 20% of the worldwide A220 fleet is grounded due to this engine crisis with similar numbers for the A320neo. The table below is compiled from numerous resources including Aeronautics Magazine and the aviation analytics firm Cirium. It’s acknowledged that not all groundings are caused by engine shortages, but this is likely the lion’s share.

AIRCRAFT TYPE WORLD-WIDE GROUNDING U.S. MARKET – GTF AIRCRAFT GROUNDED
A320neo 1378 Total, 267 Grounded (19%) 664 GTF powered aircraft / 64 Grounded (10%)
A220 450 Total, 76 Grounded (17%)

When this engine shortage is combined with a limited maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capacity across the industry the negative impact multiplies. MRO is traditionally a significant cost comprising 10-15% of an airline’s total costs. Delays are stretching maintenance periods to as long as 400 days in some cases, so the associated costs are clearly increasing.

ITA Airways is reportedly preparing a lawsuit against Pratt & Whitney. It claims that they have been forced to ground twice the number of jets as forecasted.  “The situation has become worse in the past six months,” ITA CEO Jörg Eberhart told Aviation Week.

Pratt & Whitney has made significant investments in their MRO capabilities in recent years. It also says that they are seeing improvements in the turnaround times for their GTF engine facilities. According to Aviation Week, Pratt & Whitney’s GTF MRO facilities number 21 across the globe with three more opening soon. They have also stated that the MRO capacity is not the limiting factor in completing work, but material, labor, and the supply chain are the challenges. Lastly, Pratt & Whitney has also extended liquidity to airlines such as Spirit in an effort to offset some of the impact resulting from parked aircraft. Nearly 20% of Spirit’s fleet was out of service in early 2025. Despite the assistance, engine problems were likely one of the major reasons Spirit declared bankruptcy in November 2024, followed by a second filing in August 2025.  

The news is better for CFM International; however, it has not been immune to supply chain issues and labor shortages. CFM supplies the LEAP-1A and LEAP-1B engines used on the 737MAX as well as the A320neo. While there have not been widespread groundings of those aircraft there are dozens of Airbus and Boeing jets awaiting engines before they can leave the factories.      

The aviation industry is extremely susceptible to economic conditions worldwide. When fleets are parked and airplanes are cannibalized for parts due to a single manufacturer’s loss of quality control it clearly demonstrates how fragile the industry is. The only good news is that so far there hasn't been an accident caused directly by a PW GTF engine failure. However, had the IndiGo Airlines engine failed a few seconds later (after V1) the outcome could have been dramatically different. Although hoping doesn’t make it so, let’s all hope the engine situation is resolved soon before such an accident occurs.

Manufacturing

The Aerospace Merger Bandwagon – Now There are Two

The commercial airliner industry today is dominated by just two manufacturers. Boeing and Airbus comprise approximately 90-95% of the market. The worldwide breakdown of 2025 deliveries looks like this:

Aircraft Orders Bar Chart
Airbus
49.5%
Boeing
42.2%
Embraer
4.6%
ATR
2.8%
COMAC
0.9%

How did we end up with just two companies supplying almost all new commercial aircraft in the world? A trip down memory lane would reveal that this is a relatively new development in the aerospace world. Not that long ago there were several manufacturers of both civilian and military aircraft. Those include Douglas Aircraft Company that produced the DC-4, DC-6, and DC-7. Lockheed introduced the Constellation and the Electra. Convair built the 240/340/440 series popular with regional carriers. Martin produced the 2-0-2 and 4-0-4 short-haul airliners used by TWA and Eastern. Although the names are familiar and their contributions to the aircraft industry both in war and peacetime are significant, they are all long gone.

Boeing managed to survive through it all, starting with early development of mail planes in the 1920’s and 1930’s. It built legendary bombers during WWII including the B-17 and B-29. It then launched the jet age with the B-52 Stratofortress in 1952 (still in service today) and the iconic 707 in 1958.

The other giants of early aviation haven’t fared as well. Lockheed is now Lockheed Martin. Northrup and Grumman merged into Northrup-Grumman. McDonnell became McDonnell Douglas and was later absorbed by Boeing. Convair dissolved in 1996 (founded in 1943 as Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation, acquired by General Dynamics in 1954). Competition in the industry is fierce, especially in civil aviation. Airlines seem to be either on top of the mountain in good economic times or struggling to survive during the downturns. These market fluctuations greatly impact aircraft orders and leave manufacturers to handle short-term challenges with long-term financial success. Economies of scale have helped these two manufacturers succeed while smaller companies with far smaller market shares find it nearly impossible to grow.  

The military contracting side of the business can also have its ups and downs but overall is more stable in the long term. Government contracts often involve more stability than those with civilian airlines and can be more lucrative as well. With these factors in mind the eventual merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas in 1997 makes a little more sense.

McDonnell Douglas was struggling to compete in the airliner sector during the 1990’s. The DC-10 and MC-11 programs were losing ground to both Airbus (A330/340) and Boeing (747/777) and the MD-80/90 series was aging and less competitive than the Airbus320 and Boeing 737. But McDonnell Douglas was still strong in the defense sector with its F-15 and F-18 programs among others. So, as Airbus gained ground on Boeing the acquisition of McDonnel Douglas would provide Boeing with a stronger footing in the defense segment. A deal was struck that resulted in Boeing absorbing McDonnell Douglas in a $13 billion agreement that offered McDonnell Douglas shareholders equity in Boeing.  

This epic merger of two aerospace giants has been given mixed reviews over the years. Although the space sector has provided significant revenue for Boeing, their margins are very thin. 2024 was a disastrous year with significant financial and reputation losses when the Starliner spacecraft failures left NASA astronauts unable to return to earth until rescued 286 days later by SpaceX’s Crew Dragon. Revenue has stabilized but challenges remain and a profit margin of less than 2% could easily disappear with further problems.

On the commercial side the story of the 737 MAX development delays, design and manufacturing defects, two fatal crashes, MCAS concealment, and many other MAX problems are well known. It appears that the other programs in development are not faring well either. These include certification of the 777X and the 737 MAX 7/10. Widespread delays, a labor strike, and both criminal and civil trials have taken a toll on overall company financial performance.

These failures are in stark contrast to the success of the Boeing company over the decades following WWII. The company was founded on solid engineering principles above all else. The quality and safety of each aircraft was their hallmark. Boeing’s internal culture was anchored with the principle “if it’s built here, it’s built right.” Something changed along the way and many point to the merger with McDonnell Douglas as the event that began a priority transition from engineering excellence to shareholder return.

McDonnell Douglas executives often emphasized efficiency and a pragmatic business culture that shaped the company operation. Although there is nothing inherently wrong with these principles it seems to have negatively influenced Boeing after the merger. Harry Stonecipher, McDonnell Douglas CEO and later Boeing President is quoted as saying, “We are running a business here. The business is not airplanes, it is money.” It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to understand that when the emphasis is placed on profits rather than manufacturing quality there will be systemic problems. Shortcuts will be taken to meet deadlines, and labor will be rushed. Performance will be evaluated only on jobs completed on time, and airplanes delivered will be the only metric that matters to the C-suite. Naturally these issues lead to program shortfalls such as a 737 MAX non-compliant crew alerting system. It can lead to dishonest documentation such as the concealment of the MCAS system. It can lead to manufacturing defects and errors that lead to operational problems such as door plug blow outs.  

While engaged in direct competition with Airbus the temptation for Boeing to continue cutting corners must be countered by strong leadership that empowers the technical experts to do their jobs the right way. Focusing on what made Boeing a giant of industry is the way to return it to the top. This is good for Boeing, good for the U.S., and good for the world economy and security. Boeing executives are saying the right things but are they actually doing the right things? We hear from Boeing employees on a regular basis, and the message isn’t a good one. It seems that the public statements sent from the top are contrary to the reality on the factory floors. The Foundation for Aviation Safety wants Boeing to be successful, but it can only happen through a cultural shift back to quality and safety above all.

UPS Airlines Flight 2976

Our Hearts Go Out to Louisville

The NTSB Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report for the November 4, 2025 UPS crash in Louisville has been released. As is appropriate, this report covers only the basic facts that have been discovered to this point with no in-depth analysis or conclusions. The final report will include conclusions and recommendations when it is published. That will likely come no earlier than late 2026.

This tragedy took 14 lives including the three pilots and 11 people on the ground. There were also 23 additional people injured. By all accounts the emergency response in Louisville was swift to include a shelter-in-place order for the surrounding community due to the toxic smoke plume and potential hazardous material runoff. 30 fire crews from the Louisville metro area responded to contain the fires fueled by over 200,000 pounds of jet fuel.

The focus of the investigation will be the left engine and pylon assembly. Airport surveillance video frames are included in the preliminary report and clearly show the left engine departing over the left wing just as the MD-11F was rotating for takeoff. The flight crew managed to become airborne, maintain wings level, and clear the airport perimeter fence but did not achieve any higher altitude. The left main landing gear struck a UPS warehouse roof followed by the left wing impacting an oil recycling facility. The wreckage covered an area of over 3,000 feet.

The NTSB recovered the left engine and pylon assembly along with associated hardware from areas along the runway. The report includes photos of the left pylon aft mount with fractured forward and aft lugs. There are also indications of fatigue cracking in addition to the areas of stress failure. Further investigation of these parts will continue.

The MD-11 is a derivative of the DC-10 airframe. This UPS MD-11F was built in 1991 and had accumulated almost 93,000 hours and 21,000 cycles at the time of the crash. Production of the MD-11 ended in 2000, so all active aircraft are at least 25 years old.

The preliminary report does mention the crash of American Airlines Flight 191 in Chicago on May 25, 1979, and lists it as a “similar event.” In a remarkable coincidence that crash was profiled in the October edition of The Aviation Watchdog Report. You can read that report here. In that instance the left engine separated along with three feet of the wing leading edge. The comparison is striking although only a full examination of the evidence will reveal any causal factor commonality. The FAA has grounded all MD-11, MD-10, and DC-10 aircraft pending appropriate inspections and any necessary repairs as determined by the FAA Continued Operational Safety Branch (AIR-520).    

This tragedy is a sad reminder of how unforgiving aviation can be. Our thoughts and prayers are with the families and friends of those lost or injured and the entire Louisville and UPS community.